Civic crowdfunding is a practice through which interested players can raise funds for a civic project. With Blockchains gaining traction, the process of civic crowdfunding can be implemented in a reliable, transparent and secure manner with smart contracts. Blockchain based civic crowdfunding can thus become a powerful tool for social planners and governments. One fundamental challenge in civic crowdfunding is free riding -once the civic project is provisioned, all players, irrespective of their contribution can enjoy its benefits; hence, strategic players may free ride. Researchers have addressed this challenge through the game theory lens. The proposal by Zubrickas et. al. [22] of refund bonus to the contributors in the case of the project not getting provisioned has interesting properties. As observed by Chandra et. al. [6] however, this approach faces a challenge of race condition. To address this, their proposal, PPS resolves this by considering the temporal aspects of a contribution in civic crowdfunding. However, PPS is computationally complex as well as is difficult to explain to a layperson given its complex refund bonus scheme. In this work, we look for all important properties a refund bonus scheme should have in order to discourage free riding while avoiding the race condition. We identify Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity as sufficient and necessary conditions for this. We also propose three simple refund bonus schemes, satisfying these two conditions, wherein the refund bonus of the player decreases as a geometric progression or polynomially based on the order of contribution or decreases exponentially with time. These schemes incentivize the players to contribute as early as possible and hence avoids the race condition. Further, we introduce three novel mechanisms for civic crowdfunding deploying these schemes namely, Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus based on Geometric progression (PPRG); Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus based on Polynomial function (PPRP); and Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus based on Exponential function (PPRE). We show that PPRG is the most cost effective mechanism amongst these, as well as PPS, when deployed as a smart contract. We then prove that under certain assumptions on valuations of the players, in PPRG, PPRE and PPRP, the project is funded at equilibrium. We simulate PPRG in Reinforcement Learning enviornment to show that it does not trade off cost efficiency for provision accuracy. * sankarshan.damle@research.iiit.ac.in † moinhussain.moti@students.iiit.ac.in ‡ sujit.gujar@iiit.ac.in § praphulcs@koinearth.com
Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a project by raising voluntary contributions from a large pool of interested players. Players are incentivized to contribute towards crowdfunding for private projects by of-fering them certain rewards. Using crowdfunding in order to raise funds for civic (non-excludable) goods however, introduces the free riding problem -since players cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the public project, strategic players may not contribute. If this challenge can be addressed, civic crowdfunding can lead to a greater democratic participation. It also contributes to citizens' empowerment since it allows them to collectively increase there well-being through solving societal issues. In this paper, we focus on solving the challenge of free riding in civic crowdfunding implemented using Blockchain based smart contracts.
Web-based platforms for crowdfunding have overgrown during the last decade. Popular civic crowdfunding platforms include Ioby (US, 2009), Kickstarter (US, 2009), Citizinvestor (US, 2012), Spacehive (UK, 2012) and Voor je buurt (NL, 2013) [9] . Initially, majority of the projects on these platforms were for private goods, but over the years there has been an increase in their usage for civic crowdfunding. These platforms now allow governments to propose "civic" projects like public parks, swimming pools etc. and such projects have been more successful in meeting their goals compared to other categories. Spacehive has managed to generate £5 million for over 150 projects from citizens' contribution across 68 cities in the UK [7] .
With the advancement of the blockchain technology, the industry is adopting the practice of crowdfunding projects using smart contracts. A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract [18] . Since a crowdfunding project as a smart contract is on a trusted publicly distributed ledger, it is open and auditable, making the contributions of the players and the execution of the payments transparent as well as anonymous. In addition, as there is no need for any centralized, trusted third party, this reduces the cost incurred in setting up the project. WeiFund [20] implemented in 2015 is one such decentralized crowdfunding platform on the Ethereum Blockchain. In this paper, our focus is to study game-theoretic challenges in civic crowdfunding, especially over blockchain. Our work builds on the literature which studies the lack of proper incentives for contributions towards public goods. Over the years, researchers have addressed such interaction as a game and analyzed equilibrium strategies of the players in it [2, 3, 6, 7, 22] .
In the baseline approach, the social planner uses the voluntary contribution mechanism with a provision point, provision point mechanism [3] .The social planner sets up a target amount, referred as provision point, to be raised. If the contributions by the players crosses this provision point, the project is executed. Otherwise, the contributions are returned. The mechanism has had a long history of applications. However, it has been shown to consist of several inefficient equilibria [3, 4, 16] .
Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus (PPR) [22] introduces an additional refund bonus to be paid to the players who contributed, along with their contributions, in case the project is not provisioned. With this refund bonus, PPR induces a simultaneous move game in which the project is provisioned at equilibrium. PPR fails in a sequential setting such as Internet based online platforms, since in such a setting players can observe the current amount of funds raised. Hence, in online settings, strategic players in PPR would choose to wait and free ride till the end to check if the project is provisioned and would contribute only in the end in anticipation of a refund bonus. This leads to a scenario where every strategic player is trying to compete for a refund bonus at the deadline. We refer to this scenario as a race condition. In online settings, as the players observe the net contribution of the other players, it induces a sequential game and hence we refer to these settings as sequential settings.
Provision Point mechanism with Securities (PPS) [6] introduced a class of mechanisms using complex prediction markets [1] which incentivizes a player to contribute as soon as it arrives at the crowdfunding platform, thus resolving the race condition. The challenge with practical implementation of PPS is, as PPS uses complex prediction markets, it is not only difficult to explain to a layperson but also computationally expensive to implement, primarily as a smart contract.
The introduction of refund bonus is essential in all these mechanisms as it incentivizes players to contribute and helps to avoid free riding. Hence, in this paper, we focus on provision point mechanisms with refund bonus for civic crowdfunding. In particular, we look for refund bonus schemes that can avoid free riding as well as the race condition. The goal is to identify a class of refund bonus schemes satisfying a set of conditions i.e., Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity, which are sufficient as well as necessary to implement crowdfunding projects in a sequential setting such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
We propose three novel refund bonus schemes which satisfy these conditions, and are clear to explain to a layperson as well as computationally efficient to implement as a smart contract. With these three schemes, we design novel mechanisms for civic crowdfunding, namely Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Geometric Progression (PPRG) ; Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Exponential function (PPRE); and Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Polynomial function (PPRP). We measure performance of these mechanisms by provision accuracy, the fraction of the projects that are successfully provisioned using the mechanism. We analyse the cost effectiveness of these mechanisms when deployed as smart contracts and show that PPRG is the most cost effective. We further simulate PPRG, PPRE, PPRP and PPS and show that PPRG has similar provision accuracy as PPS. In summary, the following are our contributions.
Contributions
1. We define Contribution Monotonicity (Eq. 2) and Time Monotonicity (Eq. 3) for refund bonus schemes. We prove that it is sufficient and necessary for a refund bonus scheme to satisfy these two conditions to ensure that it can implement a crowdfunding mechanism in sequential setting such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium (Theorem 1).
2.
We design three novel mechanisms for civic crowdfunding, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP based on refund bonus schemes satisfying Condition 1 and Condition 2 and identify a set of strategies which are sub-game perfect for all the three mechanisms such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium (Theorems 2, 3, 4).
3. We show that PPRG is highly cost-efficient in comparison to PPS, PPRE and PPRP as it consumes significantly less gas when implemented as a smart contract (Section 4.3).
4.
We simulate PPRG, PPRE and PPRP through a simulator and show that PPRG has similar provision accuracy as compared to PPS (Section 6).
In the next section, we summarize the notation we use and present required preliminaries.
Preliminaries
We focus on crowdfunding projects which involve provisioning of civic projects without coercion and with players arriving over time i.e., civic crowdfunding in sequential setting. Similar to previous work [3, 6, 22] , we assume that apart from knowing the history of contributions, players do not have any information regarding whether the project will get provisioned or not i.e., every player's belief is symmetric towards the project's provision. In the following subsections, we describe the crowdfunding model in consideration, summarize the required notations and present the important game-theoretic definitions used for analysis throughout the paper.
Model
A Project Maker (PM) puts a proposal for crowdfunding of a civic project P on web based crowdfunding platform; that is, we are dealing with sequential settings. PM seeks voluntary contributions towards it. The proposal specifies:
1. Target Amount: The proposal must specify a target amount (H ) of the funds necessary for the project to be provisioned. The target amount is referred to as the provision point, and mechanisms with it as provision point mechanisms.
Deadline:
The proposal must also specify a deadline (T ) by which the funds need to be raised. If the target amount is not achieved by the deadline, the project is not provisioned and the contributions are returned.
A set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} are interested in the crowdfunding of P . A Player i ∈ N has value θ i ≥ 0 if the project is provisioned. It arrives at time y i to the project, observes its valuation (θ i ) for it and can contribute x i ≥ 0 at time t i , such that y i ≤ t i ≤ T , towards its provision. Let ϑ = � i =n i =1 θ i and C = � i =n i =1 x i be the sum of the contributions. A project is provisioned if C ≥ H and not provisioned if C < H at the end of deadline T . B is the budget kept aside by the PM to be distributed as a refund bonus among the contributors, if the project is not provisioned. All the relevant notations have been provided in Table 1 . This setup induces a game amongst the players.
Let σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) be the vector of strategy profile of every player where Player i 's strategy consists of the tuple σ i = (x i , t i ), such that x i ∈ [0, H ] is its voluntary contribution to the project at time t i ∈ [y i , T ]. We use the subscript −i to represent vectors without Player i . The payoff for a Player i with valuation θ i for the project, when all the players play the strategy profile σ is π i (σ; θ i ).
Let I X be an indicator random variable which takes the value 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise. Then the payoff structure for a provision point mechanism with a refund bonus scheme R : σ → R n with budget B , for every Player i contributing x i and at time t i , will be
where R i (σ) is the share of refund bonus for Player i as per the refund bonus scheme R(σ). Let R(σ) = (R 1 (σ), . . . , R n (σ)) be the Refund Bonus Scheme for a provision point mechanism. For simplicity, we use R(·) to denote a refund bonus scheme and R i (·) to denote Player i 's share of the refund bonus as per R(·) whenever the inputs are obvious. In the next subsection, we define the important game-theoretic definitions.
Important Definitions
Definition 1 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE)). A strategy profile σ * = (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * n ) is said to be a Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if for every Player i , it maximizes the payoff π i (σ * ; θ i ) i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
The strategy profile for the Nash Equilibrium is useful in a simultaneous move game. However, for sequential settings, where the players can see the actions of the other players, they may not find it best to follow the PSNE strategy. For this, we require a strategy profile which is the best response of every player at any time during the project i.e., the best response for every sub-game induced during it. Such a strategy profile is said to be a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium.
Symbol

Definition P
The project to be crowdfunded
Amount that remains to be funded at time t i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Player id
Net contribution of the project P Table 1 : Key Notation
Here, H t is the history of the game till time t , constituting the players' arrivals and their contributions and σ * −i |H y i indicates that the players who arrive after y i follow the strategy specified by σ * −i . Informally it means that, at every stage of the game, irrespective of what has happened, it is Nash Equilibrium to follow the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium strategy for every player.
We now provide some existing literature in relation to our work in this paper.
Related Work
The literature work in civic projects for crowdfunding can be mainly classified into two types. Thresholdless Mechanisms and Threshold (Provision Point) Mechanisms. Thresholdless Mechanisms enables the PM to collect the donations regardless of the amount raised. Consequently, the provision accuracy of these mechanisms is a subjective matter. We focus on the latter class of mechanisms which require the project to aggregate a minimum level (Provision Point of the project) of funding before the PM can claim it. There is an extensive literature on the design for mechanisms with provision points for civic crowdfunding [3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 16, 19] . Morgan et. al. [15] incentivizes player contribution for civic projects using state lotteries such that a higher contribution leads to a higher likelihood of winning. The game induced attains a unique equilibrium. In Marx et. al. [14] , players contribute in a round-robin fashion such that an equilibrium exists where a player contributes if and only if other players make their equilibrium contributions. Our work is most closely related to the PPM [3] , PPR [22] and PPS [6] mechanisms.
Provision Point Mechanism (PPM)
PPM [3] is the simplest mechanism in this class where players contribute voluntarily. Players gain a positive payoff only when the project gets provisioned and a payoff of zero otherwise i.e., R P P M (σ) = ((0) | ∀i ∈ N ). Then the payoff structure of PPM, for every Player i , can be expressed as,
where, π i (·) and x i are Player i 's payoff and contribution respectively.
(θ i − x i ) is known as the provisioned payoff of the player and is rewarded to the player only in case the project gets provisioned. PPM has been shown to have multiple equilibria and also does not guarantee positive payoff to the players. It has lead the mechanism to report under-provisioning of the projects which was verified empirically by [12] .
Provision Point Mechanism With Refund (PPR)
PPM does not guarantee positive payoff for players. PPR [22] improved upon this by offering refund bonuses to the players in case the project doesn't get provisioned and rewarded payoff like PPM otherwise. The refund bonus scheme is directly proportional to player's contribution and is given as
where B is the total budget. Then the payoff structure of PPR, for every Player i , can be expressed as,
In PPR, a player has no knowledge of other players' contribution. This results in a simultaneous move game. If PPR were to be applied in a sequential setting where players can see contributions from everyone, it would collapse to a one shot simultaneous game which leads to the race condition, which we define as
. For PPR, S = N and t = T , i.e., the strategy σ * i = (x * i , T ) ∀i ∈ N constitutes a set of PSNE of PPR in sequential game. This is because the refund bonuses here are independent of time of contribution and therefore players have zero incentive to contribute early. All players delay their contributions as close to the deadline as possible and wait to free ride till the end. Such strategies lead to the project not getting provisioned in practice and are therefore undesirable. Recently, Shen [17] discussed the importance of information disclosure (eg. knowledge of current funding status etc.) in order to lure contributors to the project in various settings. Information cannot be disclosed in a simultaneous game which motivates us to devise mechanisms which work in sequential setting.
Provision Point Mechanism With Securities (PPS)
PPS [6] addresses the shortcomings of PPR by offering players refunds based on the time of their contribution. An early contributor is paid higher refund than a late contributor for the same amount. Consequently, the refund bonus scheme in this is given as
i are Player i 's time of contribution and the number of securities allocated to it, respectively. Then the payoff structure of PPS, for every Player i , can be expressed as,
The refund bonus of a contributor is determined using securities from a cost based complex prediction market [1] . In complex prediction market, there are multiple outcomes possible as against binary prediction markets. The market maker offers a security corresponding to each potential outcome and each of these securities pays an unit amount if the associated outcome is realized. For more details about such complex prediction market and securities prices, please refer to [1] . To set up a complex prediction market in the context of civic crowdfunding, PPS requires a cost function satisfying [6, [6] [7] . PPS awards every contributing player securities for the project not getting provisioned. These securities are dependent on the player contribution i.e., greater the contribution, more the number of securities alloted to the player. Each of these securities pay out an unit amount if the project is not provisioned. However, setting up such a market as well as computing securities to be alloted is computationally expensive and costly to implement as a smart contract.
Hence we want to look for better refund bonus schemes.
Desirable Properties of Refund Bonus Schemes
Motivated by the theoretical guarantees of PPR and PPS, in this paper we look for provision point mechanism with refund bonus schemes. We first identify the desirable properties of refund bonus schemes.
A desirable refund bonus scheme should not just restrict the set of strategies in a way that the project is provisioned at equilibrium, but should also incentivize greater as well as early contributions, so as to avoid the race condition, from all interested players. We constitute these desirable properties as the following two conditions for a refund bonus scheme
∀i ∈ N with budget B and which is continuous and differential over x ∀t : Condition 1 (Contribution Monotonicity). The refund must always increase with the increase in contribution so as to incentivize greater contribution i.e., R(σ) must be a monotonically increasing function with respect to contribution x i ∈ (0, H ) ∀i ∈ N or
Condition 2 (Time Monotonicity). The refund must always decrease with the increase in the duration of the project so as to incentivize early contribution i.e., R(σ) must be a monotonically decreasing function with respect to time t i ∈ (0, T ) ∀i ∈ N or R i (σ) ↓ as t i ↑ and ∃ t i < T, and Δt i s.t.,
In addition to these conditions, a refund bonus scheme R(·), must also be anonymous, i.e., it must not favor certain player(s). Formally, Property (Anonymity). For a refund bonus scheme, R(·), if the time of contributions t i and t j , for Players i , j ∈ N such that x i = x j , are swapped, then the refund share allocated to the players, R i (·) and R j (·), is also swapped, when the rest of the game remains the same.
In the next subsection, we analyze the consequence of such a refund bonus scheme on the characteristics of the game induced by it.
Sufficiency and Necessity of the Refund Bonus Scheme
Let, G be the game induced by the refund bonus scheme R(·). We require G to satisfy the following properties: Property 1. In G, at equilibrium, the total contribution equals the provision point i.e., C = H . Property 2. G must avoid the race condition.
Property 3. G is a sequential game and posses sub-game perfect equilibria (SPE).
With these properties, we present the following theorem, The first result shows that Conditions 1 and 2 are sufficient while the second result shows that these are also necessary. We now formally prove the theorem. Proof: We prove the theorem in two parts. In Part 1, we show that the two conditions are sufficient, while in Part 2 of the proof, we show that the two conditions are also necessary.
Part 1 Sufficiency:
In Steps 1, 2 and 3, we show that R(·) satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 is sufficient for Properties 1, 2 and 3 to hold.
• Step 1: From Eq. 1, at equilibrium C < H cannot hold, as any player could obtain a higher refund bonus by marginally increasing its contribution since R(·) satisfies Condition 1 and B > 0. Likewise, any player with a positive contribution could gain in payoff by marginally decreasing its contribution if C > H . Thus, at equilibrium C = H or G satisfies Property 1.
• Step 2: Every Player i contributes as soon as it arrives, since R(·) satisfies Condition 2 i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
In other words, the best response ∀i ∈ N is the strategy σ i = (x i , y i ). Thus, as per Definition 3, G avoids the race condition or G satisfies Property 2.
• Step 3: Since G satisfies Property 2, it avoids the race condition. Hence, it can be implemented in a sequential setting or G is a sequential game. Now, when an interested player enters the project and C = H , its best response would be contributing 0. However, if C < H , then its best response is the one in which its provisioned payoff is equal its not provisioned payoff. With backward induction, it is the best response for every player to follow the same strategy in which their provisioned payoffs are equal to their not provisioned payoffs irrespective of C . Thus, these strategies form a set of sub-game perfect equilibria in G or G satisfies Property 3.
Part 2 Necessity:
In Steps 1, 2 and 3 of this part, we show that the two conditions are necessary for the three properties to hold in G for a given R(·). Towards this, we need to show that "if p is true, then q is true". In Step 1, we show that "if Property 1 is true, then Condition 1 is true". We show that "if Property 2 is true, then Condition 2 is true" in Step 2. Finally, in Step 3, we show that "if Property 3 is true, then Condition 2 is true".
• Step 1: We use proof by contradiction. Assume that R(·) does not satisfy Condition 1. Then for the case of C < H , from Eq. 1, no Player i ∈ N has an incentive to contribute more since its refund bonus need not increase with an increase in contribution. Thus, in this at equilibrium, C < H may hold. Therefore, we have a contraction. Hence, Condition 1 is necessary for G to satisfy Property 1.
• Step 2: We again use proof by contradiction. Assume that R(·) does not satisfy Condition 2. That is, ∃t ≥ y i for a Player i for which,
From the Anonymity Property of R(·), this implies that for every Player j which arrives after y i and before t at least, its best response is the strategy σ j = (x j , t ). Thus, this results in the race condition at least for the set of players S = { j | y i ≤ y j ≤ t , ∀ j ∈ N }. Therefore, we have a contraction. Hence, Condition 2 is necessary for G to satisfy Property 2.
• Step 3: Similar to Steps 1 and 2 of Part 2, we use proof by contradiction. Assume that R(·) does not satisfy Condition 2. As shown in Step 2 above, if Condition 2 is not satisfied it results in the race condition. Thus G collapses to a simultaneous move game in such a setting. Hence, there remains no notion of a "sub-game" in G anymore and consequently, it can not posses a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Therefore, we have a contraction. Hence, Condition 2 is necessary for G to satisfy Property 3.
In addition to these desirable properties, a refund bonus scheme should also be clear to explain to a layperson whilst being computationally efficient and cost effective when deployed as a smart contract.
Through this generalized result on refund bonus schemes, we show the following proposition:
Proposition 1. PPS satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2.
Proof: Since every cost function used in PPS for crowdfunding must satisfy 
In Eq. 4, as t i ↑, q 
Corollary 1. PPS avoids the race condition and thus can be implemented sequentially.
Proof: The authors prove in [6, Theorem 3] that PPS can be implemented sequentially without using Condition 1 and 2. However, from Proposition 1, and the fact that PPS payoff structure follows Eq. 1, it is trivial to see from Theorem 1 that PPS can be implemented in a sequential setting.
In then next subsection, we present three novel refund schemes satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 and the provision point mechanisms based on them. We then compare their cost effectiveness when deployed as a smart contract. Table 2 presents three novel refund schemes for a Player i contributing x i at time t i as well as the mechanisms which deploy them. Note that, we require all the refund bonus schemes to converge to a particular sum that can be pre-computed. This convergence allows the refund bonus scheme to be budget balanced. The parameters a, γ, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 and B are mechanism parameters (for their respective mechanisms) which the PM is required to announce at the start of the project.
Refund Bonus Schemes
The refund schemes R P P RG (·) and R P P RP (·) refunds the contributing players based on the sequence of their arrivals, while the refund scheme R P P RE (·) refunds them on the basis of their time of contribution. We now show that all these schemes satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 through the following claims.
Mechanism
Refund Scheme
Parameters Covergence of Sum Based On
Polynomial Function Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
Therefore, R P P RG (·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i .
Claim 2. R P P RG (σ) satisfies Condition 2.
Proof: For every Player i ∈ N arriving at time y i , its share of the refund bonus given by R P P RG (·) will only decrease from that point in time, since its position in the sequence of contributing players can only go down, making it liable for a lesser share of the bonus, for the same contribution. Lett i be the position of the player arriving at time y i , when it contributes at time t i . Whilet i will take discrete values corresponding to the position of the players, for the purpose of differentiation, lett i ∈ R. Now, we can argue that at every epoch of time t i , Playert i will contribute to the project. With this, R P P RG (·) can be written as,
Further observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
Therefore, R P P RG (·) satisfies Condition 2.
Claim 3. R P P RE (σ) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
Therefore, R P P RE (·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i .
Claim 4. R P P RE (σ) satisfies Condition 2 ∀i ∈ N .
Therefore, R P P RE (·) satisfies Condition 2 ∀i .
Claim 5. R P P RP (σ) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Therefore, R P P RP (·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i . Claim 6. R P P RP (σ) satisfies Condition 2.
Proof:
The claim follows similar to Claim 2. For every Player i ∈ N arriving at time y i , its share of the refund bonus given by R P P RP (·) will only decrease from that point in time, since its position in the sequence of contributing players can only go down, making it liable for a lesser share of the bonus, for the same contribution. Lett i be the position of the player arriving at time y i , when it contributes at time t i . Whilẽ t i will take discrete values corresponding to the position of the players, for the purpose of differentiation, lett i ∈ R. Now, we can argue that at every epoch of time t i , Playert i will contribute to the project. With this, R P P RP (·) can be written as,
The inequality follows from the fact that 1
Therefore, R P P RG (·) satisfies Condition 2. The evolution in the refund share of these three schemes, in comparison to PPR and PPS, with respect to the increase in time, for a Player i is depicted in Figure 1 . To compare the refund shares of different schemes we keep Player i 's contribution x i , the budget B and the provision point H same for all, with
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the time at which Player i contributes. For PPRG and PPRP, this is equivalent to the sequence in which the players contribute, i.e., the axis representst i , as defined in Claim 2 and Claim 6 respectively. For PPRE, the horizontal axis is the epoch of time at which Player i contributes, i.e., t i . For PPS, the horizontal axis is also the sequence of players contributing, just like in PPRG and PPRP. Each Playert j (j <ĩ ) is issued a constant number of securities, i.e., the number of outstanding securities in the market increases by a constant number as the number of players contributing increases.
As evident in Figure 1 , the refund scheme of PPRG decreases gradually when compared to refund schemes of PPRE and PPRP. As a result, PPRG can provide significant refund share for greater number of players for the same bonus budget. We now compare the cost effectiveness of these schemes when deployed as a smart contract.
Gas Comparisons
Every smart contract is compiled to a bytecode and is then executed on EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine). EVM is sandboxed and completely isolated from the rest of the network and thus, every node runs each instruction independently on EVM. For executing every instruction, there is a specified cost, expressed in the number of gas units. Gas is the name for the execution fee that senders of transactions need to pay for every operation made on an Ethereum blockchain. Gas and ether are decoupled deliberately since units of gas align with computation units having a natural cost, while the price of ether generally fluctuates as a result of market forces. The Ethereum protocol charges a fee per computational step that is executed in a contract or transaction to prevent deliberate attacks and abuse on the Ethereum network [10] . Table 3 provides a hypothetical cost comparison between PPS, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP based on the Gas usage statistics given in [5, 21] . The cost in Gas units is as follows for the relevant operations: ADD: 3, SUB: 3, MUL: 5, DIV: 5, EXP(x): 10 + 10 * l og (x) and LOG(x): 365 + 8 * size of x in bytes.
Note that, we need not require any exponential calculations in PPRG. Towards this, the PM can have a variable (say v al ) to store the previous GP term. For instance, when the first player contributes it is allocated a ×(1/γ) 0 . Post this, v al = a ×(1/γ) 0 . The second player to contribute is then allocated a ×(1/γ) 1 or v al × (1/γ) after which v al is updated with this value. Thus, in PPRG, we can replace an exponential operation with multiplication operation which is significantly less expensive.
For every player, while PPRG takes 21 gas units, PPRP takes 31 gas units, PPRE takes atleast 31 gas units and PPS takes at least 407 gas units. When implemented on smart contract, PPS is an expensive mechanism because of its logarithmic scoring rule for calculating payment rewards. PPRG, PPRP and PPRE on the other hand use simpler operations and therefore have minimal operational cost.
PPRG's cost efficiency when deployed as smart contract, along with the fact that it allocates significant refund shares for greater number of players when compared to PPRE and PPRP, makes it the best mechanism out of the three introduced.
In the next section, we formally describe all the three mechanisms and analyze them.
Provision Point Mechanisms
In the following subsections, we describe the three mechanisms introduced namely, Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Geometric Progression (PPRG) ; Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Exponential function (PPRE); and Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Polynomial function (PPRP) in detail. Protocol 1 summarizes these mechanisms in general.
Operation PPS  PPRG  PPRE  PPRP  Operations  Gas Consumed  Operations Gas Consumed  Operations  Gas Consumed  Operations Gas Consumed  ADD  2  6  2  6  2  6  2  6  SUB  2  6  0  0  0  0  0  0  MUL  2  10  2  10  2  10  3  15  DIV  2  10  1  5  1  5  2 Table 3 : Gas Consumption comparison between PPS, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP for a player. All values are in Gas units.
Protocol 1: General Mechanism
1. The PM announces the start of the project with a proposal specifying a target H and deadline T as well as the other mechanism parameters such as the bonus B etc.
2. An interested player arrives and contributes x i to the project 3. The protocol continues until the contributions reach the target amount at which point the project is provisioned 4. If the contributions fail to reach the target until the deadline T , the project is not provisioned 5. Refund will be distributed by the PM accordingly based on the outcome
Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Geometric Progression (PPRG)
In this subsection, we describe the mechanism Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Geometric Progression (PPRG), for crowdfunding a civic project. PPRG incentivizes an interested player to contribute as soon as it arrives at the crowdfunding platform. In PPRG, for the same contribution of Player i and Player j i.e., x i = x j , the one who contributed earlier obtains a higher share of the refund bonus. These difference in shares is allocated using the terms of an infinite geometric progression series (GP) with common ratio < 1. We use an infinite GP to allocate these shares since in it, every term is lesser than its previous term and also since the sum of all these terms converges to a constant that can be precomputed. This convergence allows the refund bonus scheme to be budget balanced. The mechanism is summarized in Protocol 1 and has a refund bonus scheme as described next.
Refund Bonus Scheme
The sum of an infinite GP with a as the first term and 1/γ as the commonn ratio, can be given as,
With this, we propose a novel refund bonus scheme R P P RG (σ) defined as
for every Player i ∈ N , B as the total bonus budget allocated for the project by the PM and where σ = ((x i , t i ) | ∀i ∈ N ). The values a and γ are mechanism parameters which the PM is required to announce at the start of the project.
Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Exponential Function (PPRE)
In this subsection, we describe Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Exponential Function (PPRE). The refund bonus scheme in this mechiansm is as follows,
where K 2 > 0 and is a mechanism parameter with x i as Player i 's contribution at time t i .
Equilibrium Analysis of PPRE
We will now provide the equilibrium analysis of this mechanism as the following theorem, Theorem 3. For PPRE, with the refund p i as described by Eq. 5 ∀i ∈ N , ϑ ≥ H C = H , which satisfies Eq. 8 and has the payoff structure as given by Eq. 1, the set of strategies
� ∀i ∈ N are sub-game perfect equilibria. In this, x * i is the contribution towards the project, y i is the arrival time to the project of Player i , respectively.
Proof. The proof for the theorem follows similar to as presented for Theorem 2. The condition for the existence of Nash Equilibrium for PPRE is given as,
Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Polynomial Function (PPRP)
In this section, we describe Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Polynomial Function in detail. The refund bonus scheme in this mechiansm is as follows,
where K 3 > 0 and is a mechanism parameter with x i as Player i 's contribution at time t i .
Equilibrium Analysis of PPRP
We will now provide the equilibrium analysis of this mechanism as the following theorem, Theorem 4. For PPRP, with the refund p i as described by Eq. 5 ∀i ∈ N , ϑ ≥ H C = H , which satisfies Eq. 10 and has the payoff structure as given by Eq. 1, the set of strategies
Proof. The proof for the theorem follows similar to as presented for Theorem 2. The condition for the existence of Nash Equilibrium for PPRP is given as,
In the next section, we look at implementation aspects of PPRG, PPRE and PPRP in terms of its provision accuracy with respect to PPS. We also look at the effect of B on the provision accuracy of all these mechanisms.
Simulation Analysis
In Section 4.3 we analyzed PPRG, PPRE and PPRP in a hypothetical cost comparison with respect to PPS based on Gas usage statistics if they were implemented as smart contracts. In this section, we compare PPRG, PPRE, PPRP and PPS for provision accuracy using a civic crowdfunding proprietary simulator built in-house in KoineArth [13] .
It is very challenging to test civic crowdsourcing mechanisms in a real world environment because of the irreversible nature of the civic properties and decisions made in the process. Therefore, we employ Reinforcement Learning (RL) based simulations to test and compare the applicability and performance of the mechanisms. Hence, KoineArth and IIIT-H have jointly developed an RL based proprietary simulation environment for the same purpose. RL is an area of Machine Learning where agents (players in our setting) interact with an environment and learn through a trial and error process where each action is rewarded or penalized based on its consequences on the game. In this simulator, we create a reinforcement learning environment for PPRG, PPRE, PPRP and PPS where agents learn to participate in the mechanisms. Agents go through repetitive iterations and learn their best strategy through rewards distributed by the corresponding mechanism. We run the simulation of 25 agents for all the mechanisms and obtain comparison results between PPRG, PPRE, PPRP with respect to PPS. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the results of the comparison.
Among PPRG, PPRE and PPRP, it is clear to see that PPRG shows better provision accuracies. PPRP shows slightly better accuracies for when the total expected valuation (E (ϑ)) is low (5 times the provision point), but the gain in the accuracy is not significant. Thus, we can safely conclude that PPRG comfortably performs better than PPRE and PPRP. When compared to PPS, PPRG shows significantly good provision accuracies when E (ϑ) is high (10 times provision point, for instance). Even when PPS shows slightly higher accuracies, it only comes at the expense of a budget very close to the maximum possible budget (B ) which is difficult to get in realistic circumstances. However, for a reasonable budget of approximately 0.5 × B or less, both the mechanisms share similar accuracies, therefore, it is safe to claim that PPS and PPRG perform equally good in terms of provision accuracy for a rational budget.
Conclusion
In this paper, we looked at certain research aspects of implementing civic crowdfunding as a blockchain based smart contract. As proved in theory and observed in practice, general civic crowdfunding faces a problem of free riding by the strategic players. PPR by Zubrickas et. al. [22] introduced the notion of refund bonus to the contributors in the event of the project not getting provisioned. Chandra et. al. [6] observed that PPR has challenges in implementing over web-based platforms. We refer to this as a race condition. To avoid race condition, PPS by Chandra et. al. [6] introduced a refund bonus of which calculations depend upon a complex prediction market. It is computationally complex and hence inefficient to implement as a blockchain based smart contract. Besides, it faces a challenge of explaining it to a layperson.
In this paper, we introduced two conditions, namely Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity for refund bonus schemes in provision point mechanisms. We proved that these two conditions are sufficient as well as necessary to implement provision point mechanisms with refund bonus to possess an equilibrium that avoids free riding and race condition. With this, we proposed three simple refund bonus schemes based on geometric progression, exponential and polynomial functions. We designed novel mechanisms, namely, Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Geometric progression (PPRG); Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Exponential function (PPRE); and Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Polynomial function (PPRP). We should that PPRG has much less cost when implemented as a smart contract over Ethereum framework. To measure the performance of such refund bonus schemes, we introduce a notion of provision accuracy. Our simulations showed that, whenever there is a hefty valuation for the project under consideration, with small refund bonus budgets, PPRG achieves the same provision accuracy as PPS. We leave it for future work to explore other refund bonus schemes having simplicity and efficiency as PPRG and much higher provision accuracies when the aggregate of the players' valuations is just over target value.
